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Lakatos and Machine Creativity
Alison Pease
 
and Simon Colton

and Alan Smaill

and John Lee

Abstract. We argue that Lakatos’ work on the history and philos-
ophy of mathematics is of key relevance to machine creativity as it
suggests ways in which to explore and transform concept spaces, re-
represent knowledge and change evaluation criteria. We describe ap-
proaches to implementing methods which Lakatos identifies, includ-
ing our own approach, which extends Colton’s HR and has enabled
us to automatically generate mathematical conjectures, concepts and
examples which were previously impossible in HR - including Gold-
bach’s conjecture. The methods are of general importance as they
can be applied to many domains - we describe their theoretical appli-
cation to game plans, two-dimensional geometry, moral philosophy,
philosophy of mind, political argument and meta-level reasoning.
1 INTRODUCTION
Our thesis in this paper is that Lakatos’s Proofs and Refutations [17]
has important and exciting implications for the field of machine cre-
ativity. This book provides a rational reconstruction of the devel-
opment of the proof of Euler’s conjecture, in which new concepts,
conjectures and ‘proofs’ are invented. It spans 200 years of in-depth
development in this area, describing methods which were used to
generate and evaluate ideas, and the evolution of the methods them-
selves, thus operating on both object and meta-level. We argue that
the methods which Lakatos identifies:
(i) are extremely relevant to machine creativity (key issues in creativ-
ity research are described in  2 and Lakatos’ methods in  3);
(ii) can be automated (  4), and
(iii) apply to other domains (  5).
If this is the case then they will be powerful tools in machine creativ-
ity.
Our motivation is the cognitive scientific goal of understanding
intelligent action, aiming to elucidate creativity by modelling the ex-
ternal process of discovery via interaction. This differs from trying to
understand the mind by modelling internal cognitive processes which
lead to creative output. A secondary motivation is to develop new
techniques of general use in AI. If successfully automated, Lakatos’s
methods will be relevant to concept formation, representation and
modelling interaction in mathematics.
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2 MACHINE CREATIVITY
2.1 Exploration and Transformation
Boden’s theory of creativity [3], in which she aims both to state what
it is, and suggest how it is possible, has had a major impact on the
field of machine creativity. She uses the metaphor of a concept space
which is mapped, explored, and transformed (METCS) to provide an
account of novelty. An item in a little explored area but still within
the boundaries is ‘merely’ novel, and outside but close to the bound-
aries ‘fundamentally’ novel. While considering both types of novelty
to be potentially creative (subject to a value criterion), she regards ex-
ploratory creativity to be less creative than transformational creativ-
ity. Criticisms have been levelled in broadly two areas; (i) question-
ing Boden’s analysis of the role that each aspect of METCS plays in
creativity (for example Bundy’s claim that working within a mathe-
matical space may be more creative than changing the space [5]), and
(ii) questioning the value of the concept space metaphor, i.e. whether
it is always possible to define concept spaces (for example it is diffi-
cult to state which rules define theoretical boundaries of natural lan-
guage). Boden acknowledges the criticism and in her later writings
the status of exploratory creativity is higher, going from “mere nov-
elty” to a kind of creativity which is “not to be sneezed at” [2]. She
suggests that the answer to the problem of defining concept spaces is
to identify a range of putative concept spaces and use them to evalu-
ate the worth of her analogy [1].
2.2 Re-Representation
An important way in which a domain may be explored or trans-
formed is by re-representing items within it. Kuhn[15] wrote that a
paradigm shift (or transformation), in which we perceive something
in a totally different way, is one of the main stages in the cycle of
scientific development. James[13] (cited in [11]) wrote that we rep-
resent an object according to the property which is most useful to
us; if that changes then we need to change our representation. For
example I would normally see a newspaper as essentially for read-
ing, however if my principle need is warmth then its key feature be-
comes its flammability. This is an example of radical reshaping, one
of the factors identified by Hofstadter[11] which influence the way
in which we perceive something; other factors are belief - who do I
think wrote it?, goals - why am I reading it? and external context -
what is its immediate environment?
Karmiloff-Smith[14], referring to Boden’s METCS metaphor, pro-
poses that the ability to explore a domain comes after a process of
representational redescription, in which implicit knowledge is ini-
tially acquired. Key details are then abstracted and the knowledge re-
described - this is now explicit knowledge and inter-domain connec-
tions may be made. This process continues with each stage building
on the last, and the knowledge being made more explicit and flexible
(for example imagining counterfactuals). All levels of knowledge are
retained for efficiency in any given situation, where creativity results
from declarative knowledge (which may be explored), as opposed to
procedural knowledge (which may only be used). (She supports her
argument with results of experiments in which children of different
ages were asked to draw ‘funny’ houses or people. Younger children
(4 - 6 years old) were unable to deviate from the normal pictures, and
any differences consisted of adding elements to a completed drawing,
whereas the drawings of the older children (8 - 10 years old) showed
much more variation.)
Boden also considers the importance of the process of represen-
tation in creativity, in [3]. A new representation may be a helpful
or even necessary step in a creative solution. Consider the sequence
	

	
	
	

	
 [11, p. 16]. What is the next number? Now con-
sider the sequence represented below5. An answer is now much eas-
ier to find, hence the step from the first to the second representation
may be creative. As an example Boden cites Niels Bohr’s representa-
tion of the atom as a solar system, which suggested questions about
orbits of electrons, leading to the discovery of new and useful knowl-
edge.
(Re)representation is a long standing problem in AI, with much
work carried out, eg. [19]. It consists of two problems; (i) how to
generate different representations, and (ii) how to choose between
them.
2.3 Dynamic evaluation criteria
Many theories of creativity are based on a 2-stage model of gener-
ation and evaluation, referred to in [19] as the ‘central loop of cre-
ativity’. These stages are thought to run concurrently or cyclically
rather than sequentially. While Boden expounds her theory of nov-
elty (  2.1) in depth she has not developed a theory of value (i.e. an
evaluation stage). A value criterion is clearly necessary in evaluating
creativity and Boden emphasises this point. However she believes
that value is not definable in scientific terms, nor constant (being in-
fluenced by unpredictable factors such as nationality, fashion, rivalry
and commercialism). Certainly creative work which is historically
new (Boden’s h-creativity[3]) by definition cannot be subject to fa-
miliar criteria. As pointed out in [22], the ability to measure quality
in a field without mistakes would imply that that field was incapable
of any further transformation. This is reflected by the large number of
examples of work which was not valued at the time it was produced,
for example Van Gogh’s paintings, group theory, or immunisation.
The area of dynamic evaluation criteria then, while little developed
and requiring much further research, is essential to theories of cre-
ativity.
2.4 Key issues in machine creativity
In view of the research above we are interested in:
 identifying a putative concept space;
 exploration (object-level) of this concept space;
 transformation (meta-level) of this concept space;
 determining (i) ways in which knowledge may be re-represented,
and motivations for doing so, and (ii) ways in which to use the
new representation to further explore or transform a domain, and
 developing an account of dynamic evaluation criteria.
We show how Lakatos’ methods [17] suggest ways in which to
achieve these goals.
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3 LAKATOS-STYLE REASONING
CUBE                                  TETRAHEDRON                     OCTAHEDRON
8 - 12 + 6 = 2                              4 - 6 + 4 = 2                               5 - 8 + 5 = 2
Figure 1. Examples of polyhedra and their Euler characteristic !#"%$'&)(
Lakatos describes the evolution of the conjecture and proof that
for all polyhedra, the number of vertices ( * ) minus the number of
edges ( + ) plus the number of faces ( , ) equals 2. It is presented
as a discussion between a group of students and their teacher. The
initial conjecture ( - ) is found by induction; i.e. since - holds for
all regular polyhedra (eg. the cube in Figure 2) the class guess that
it might hold for all polyhedra. They start with Cauchy’s ‘proof’
below [17, p. 7]:
(1) remove one face of the polyhedron and stretch it flat onto a
blackboard. (If - holds, we now have */.0+213,54  );
(2) cut all polygons on the board into triangles by drawing more
edges. ( *6.2+718, stays constant as each new edge forms a new
face);
(3) remove each triangle on the board one by one. ( *9./+617,
continues to remain constant since we either remove 2 edges, a
vertex and a face, or one edge and one face). At the end we are left
with a single triangle, for which */.:+;1<,/4  .  1  4  .
The methods below are summarised in Table 1.
3.1 Exploring the polyhedra domain
HOLLOW CUBE
16 - 24 + 12 = 4
TWIN TETRAHEDRA
6 - 11 + 8 = 3
PICTURE FRAME
16 - 32 + 16 = 0
Figure 2. Counterexamples to the conjecture that for all polyhedra,
!<"'$=&#(
Counterexamples are soon found, such as the hollow cube, and some
students use these to reject - (the method of surrender). This is pre-
sented as a naive reaction, in which many valuable ideas may be lost
by subjecting conjectures to overly harsh judgement too soon. An-
other reaction is to modify concept definitions to exclude the coun-
terexamples (the method of monster-barring). Counterexamples are
seen as monsters, which should not be allowed to upstage a theorem
which brings harmony to the field. With the emergence of more and
more counterexamples the definition of polyhedron shrinks from a
solid whose surface consists of polygonal faces to a surface consist-
ing of a system of polygons (thus excluding the hollow cube) to a
system of polygons arranged in such a way that (1) exactly two poly-
gons meet at every edge and (2) it is possible to get from the inside
of any polygon to the inside of any other polygon by a route which
never crosses any edge at a vertex (to exclude the twin polyhedron).
More counterexamples lead to arguments over the meaning of terms
in the definitions, and polygon, area, and edge are further defined,
with the strictest definition being taken in each case.
Rather than see counterexamples as monsters and modify concept
definitions to exclude them, one student suggests that they are valid
examples of polyhedra but can be seen as exceptions, with the ap-
propriate reaction being to modify the conjecture to exclude them.
This can be done in two ways. Those properties which counterex-
amples share and positive examples lack should be found and then
either a whole class or particular examples excluded; such as gen-
eralising from hollow cubes to polyhedra with cavities, the picture
frame to polyhedra with tunnels and twin tetrahedra to polyhedra
with multiple structure, and modifying - to ‘for any polyhedra with-
out cavities, tunnels or multiple structure, *>.8+?15,@4 	 ’ (the
method of exception-barring by piecemeal exclusion). Alternatively
since the class cannot be certain to have listed all the exceptions
(above) some students advocate withdrawing into a much smaller do-
main for which - seems certain to hold. This may be done by looking
at the properties which all positive examples share and counterexam-
ples lack. For instance all the positive (and none of the negative)
examples are convex. The domain of application is then restricted ac-
cordingly, i.e. - becomes ‘for any convex polyhedra, *).A+B1C,/4 	 ’
(the method of exception-barring by strategic withdrawal).
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STAR POLYHEDRON
12 - 30 + 12 = -6
(if a face is a pentagon)
         OR
32 - 90 + 60 = 2
(if a face is a triangle)
Figure 3. Different representations of the star polyhedron
Another alternative to barring a monster or counterexample is to
bar a ‘monstrous interpretation’. That is, reinterpret (or re-represent)
a counterexample so that it is no longer a counterexample. For exam-
ple the star-polyhedron in Figure 3 is only a counterexample if it is
thought to have 12 star-pentagon faces, forming 12 vertices and 30
edges. It can also be interpreted as having 60 triangular faces, form-
ing 32 vertices and 90 edges - in which case - holds. This is the
method of monster-adjusting, and leads to analysis of the concept
face.
3.2 Using the proof - a dynamic evaluation criteria
At this point the teacher complains that the students’ concept and
conjecture modifications will always be ad hoc and further coun-
terexamples may potentially exist even if they cannot be found.
Mathematical certainty, therefore, cannot be achieved using these
methods. Additionally they have yet to refer to the proof initially
offered. The objection is that the students have no way of evaluat-
ing their conjecture other than by reference to known examples (or
counterexamples). The ‘proof’ is one way of evaluating a conjecture,
where a convincing proof suggests a valuable conjecture (clearly
there are other criteria such as non-triviality too). Lakatos calls the
interplay between conjecture and proof “the intrinsic unity between
the ‘logic of discovery’ and the ‘logic of justification’ ” [17, p. 37].
A new conjecture gives rise to a new proof, or, in machine creativity
terms, dynamic evaluation criteria. Similarly, new evaluation criteria
suggest new results. The teacher distinguishes between global and
local counterexamples, where a global counterexample is one which
violates the conjecture (so the conjecture is flawed) and a local coun-
terexample violates a step of the proof but not the conjecture (a criti-
cism of the proof but not the conjecture). When a counterexample is
found it should be tested to see which type it is (it may be both).
The method of explicit lemma-incorporation consists of finding
which step of a faulty proof a global counterexample violates and
then making that step a condition of the conjecture. For example all
of the counterexamples found above violate the first step of the proof
since they cannot be stretched flat onto a blackboard. Therefore -
becomes ‘for any polyhedra which, by removing one face can be
stretched flat onto a blackboard, *3.X+=1Y,/4 	 ’ thereby upholding
the proof but reducing the domain of the main conjecture to the very
domain of the guilty lemma (proof step). It may be the case that a
counterexample to the conjecture appears not to violate any of the
proof steps, for example a cylinder is a counterexample to - but does
not obviously violate any lemmas. However it does violate the hidden
assumption in lemma 1 that the result of stretching the polyhedron
on the board will be a connected network. The method of hidden
lemma-incorporation is where a global counterexample is used to
identify hidden assumptions within a step which are violated, and
then to make the assumption a condition. So this assumption is added
to the proof - thus modifying the evaluation criteria - and made a
condition, i.e. - becomes ‘for any polyhedra which, by removing
one face can be stretched flat onto a blackboard and the resulting
network be connected, */.:+;1<,/4 	 ’.
The method of proofs and refutations provides a way of generat-
ing counterexamples by analysing proof steps, as well as improving
a proof by use of counterexamples. Counterexamples which violate
particular steps are sought, such as the picture frame in Figure 2
which the students discovered by looking for a polyhedron which
after having a face removed could not be stretched flat onto a plane.
When a counterexample is found it should be ascertained whether
it is local, global or both. If it is local then the lemma should be
modified to exclude the counterexample, and if it is global then
either the method of explicit lemma incorporation (if it is also lo-
cal), or hidden lemma incorporation (if it is not local) should be used.
3.3 How is Lakatos relevant to machine creativity?
In  2.4 we identified issues within machine creativity of key interest.
We now show how Lakatos’ work is relevant to these issues.
Identifying a putative concept space - Lakatos’ work is in the
mathematical domain which is a putative concept space since the
boundaries of its concept spaces are relatively clearly defined by
axioms, rules of inference, meta-mathematical beliefs and concept
definitions.
Exploration of this concept space - Using Lakatos’ methods of
induction, surrender, monster-barring, piecemeal exclusion, strate-
gic withdrawal, monster-adjusting and lemma incorporation the
students have built and explored a theory of polyhedra, containing:

conjectures - ‘for all polyhedra, *<.Z+=1#,/4 	 ’; ‘for any polyhe-
dra without cavities, tunnels or multiple structure, *[.\+<1=,/4 	 ’;
‘for any convex polyhedra, *6.[+71],^4 	 ’; ‘for any polyhedra
which, by removing one face can be stretched flat onto a blackboard
and the resulting network be connected, */.=+;13,54 	 ’;

concepts - regular polyhedra; a solid whose surface consists of
polygonal faces; a surface consisting of a system of polygons; a sys-
tem of polygons arranged in such a way that (1) exactly two polygons
meet at every edge and (2) it is possible to get from the inside of any
polygon to the inside of any other polygon by a route which never
crosses any edge at a vertex; polygon; area; edge; polyhedra with
Method Description
Induction Generalise from particulars
Surrender Look for counterexamples to a conjecture _ and use them to refute it
Monster barring Modify a concept definition so as to exclude an unwanted counterexample
Piecemeal exclusion Find those properties which make a counterexample fail _ and then modify _ by excluding that type of counterexample
Strategic withdrawal Consider the examples for which _ does hold, generalise and limit _ to that type of example
Monster adjusting Reinterpret a counterexample so that it no longer violates _
Lemma incorporation Given a global counterexample, find which step of the proof it violates and then modify _ by making that step a condition.
Given a local counterexample (which violates a proof step but not _ ), look for a hidden assumption in the proof step, then
modify the proof and _ by making the assumption an explicit condition.
Proofs and refutations Use the proof steps to suggest counterexamples. For any counterexamples found, test whether they are local or global
counterexamples and perform lemma incorporation
Table 1. Summary of Lakatos’ methods
cavities; polyhedra with tunnels; polyhedra with multiple structure;
convex polyhedra; face; and

examples/counterexamples - the regular polyhedra (tetrahedron;
cube; octahedron; icosahedron and dodecahedron); hollow cube;
twin tetrahedra; picture frame; star polyhedron; and cylinder.
Transformation of this concept space - much of the dialogue in
[17] is about how mathematics should be done, for instance what the
role of proof is, how conjectures should be modified, the value of
searching for counterexamples, which of the methods are preferable,
etc. In  5.6 we discuss how the methods themselves could help
determine which method is most appropriate.
Re-representing knowledge and using the new representation
- monster-adjusting has suggested ways in which to re-represent
items, motivations for doing so (in order to preserve a conjecture
which is thought valuable), and ways to use the new representation
to further explore the domain (by analysing subconcepts inherent in
a more encompassing concept).
Developing an account of dynamic evaluation criteria - the inter-
play shown in [17] between generation and evaluation is one of the
most exciting aspects of Lakatos’ work. Conjectures (and concepts
and examples/counterexamples) are generated using the methods de-
scribed and evaluated by the ‘proof’. That is, ‘proofs’ can be seen
as ways of evaluating the conjectures, since if a proof - or strong
argument - can be found then the conjecture is highly valued as it
may be a theorem. Indirectly the concepts within the conjectures are
also evaluated by a proof if concepts within theorems are considered
useful. Although Lakatos does not describe how to initially generate
a proof (leaving this to [23]), he does - in his lemma incorporation
method describe how it can be modified, thus forming dynamic eval-
uation criteria.
4 LAKATOS’S METHODS CAN BE
AUTOMATED
4.1 The HR program
To show that Lakatos-style reasoning can be automated, we imple-
mented such methods in the HR automated theory formation program
[6]. HR is given background information about a domain, including
some objects of interest and some initial concepts, supplied with a
definition and examples. For instance, in number theory, the objects
of interest are integers, and the initial concepts include multiplication
and addition. HR forms new concepts by using one of 10 general pro-
duction rules to transform one (or two) old concepts into a new one.
For example, to construct the concept of prime numbers (with exactly
two divisors), HR passes the concept of integers ` and a for which a
divides ` , through the size production rule, to produce the function:
bdc
`feg4>h ijalkfa divides `nmfh 
 i.e.,
bdc
`ne is the number of divisors of ` .
Following this, HR uses the split production to produce the concept
of integers ` for which
bdc
`feo4
	
, i.e., integers which have exactly
two divisors (prime numbers).
Using the objects of interest to provide data, HR also builds sets
of examples for each concept and the examples are used to make
conjectures empirically. In particular, if HR finds that the examples
of one concept are all examples of another, it makes the implication
conjecture that the definition of the first implies the definition of the
second. In addition to forming concepts and conjectures, HR also
uses the Otter theorem prover and others to prove theorems, and the
MACE model generator to find counterexamples to non-theorems.
HR’s approach can be characterised as concept-driven, i.e., con-
jectures are made in response to the invention of new concepts.
However, in addition to advocating the social nature of discovery,
Lakatos also suggests a conjecture-driven approach, where concepts
are introduced in response to the discovery of a conjecture. Hence
we improved HR’s model of theory formation to enable:
 Production of conjectures with known counterexamples. Previ-
ously, only conjectures true of all examples were made.
 Analysis of faulty conjectures to suggest theory formation steps
which invent concepts that fix the conjecture statement.
 A multi-agent approach, with agents able to request and commu-
nicate concepts, conjectures, proofs and counterexamples.
We implemented two ways to adjust faulty conjectures, inspired
by Lakatos’s exception barring methods. Firstly, if HR makes a con-
jecture for which there are a small number of counterexamples (with
the number specified by the user), it will invent a concept with a def-
inition which excludes the counterexamples. For instance, given the
numbers 1 to 10, HR makes the conjecture that all odd numbers are
prime, with 1 and 9 as counterexamples. It then invents the concept
of odd numbers except 1 and 9, in order to make the conjecture that
odd numbers except 1 and 9 are prime. Of course, if HR was given
the numbers 1 to 30, the counterexamples would be p
q
r
	p
	r
and 	s , and it is likely that HR would reject the conjecture.
Secondly, if HR makes a conjecture which states, say, t cvu e im-
plies w
cvu
e and there are a sizeable number of counterexamples
(again specified by the user), HR will try to find a concept stating a
property x
cvu
e which is true of all the counterexamples and no oth-
ers. If successful, it will invent the concept of objects u for which
tcvu
eﬃy8.3w
cvu
e , which will fix the conjecture. For example, when
HR works with the numbers 1 to 30, it makes the conjecture that all
integers have an even number of divisors, with p
{zf
{qf
ﬂ| and 	pr as
counterexamples. It then identifies that square numbers have exactly
these examples, and alters the conjecture to be: all integers except
square numbers have an even number of divisors.
With the multi-agent version of HR set up such that each agent
asks the others, rather than MACE to generate counterexamples, the
following scenario occurs: the agents are given different sets of ob-
jects of interest, and one of them makes a conjecture for which it has
no counterexample. It then communicates this to the other agents,
who reply with suitable counterexamples from their theory. The first
agent can then reject the conjecture or attempt to drive the theory
formation towards concepts which fix the conjecture. This is analo-
gous to Lakatos’s polyhedra example discussed above, and we claim
to have implemented Lakatos-style reasoning, demonstrated further
by the following two number theory sessions with HR.
4.2 Case study: number theory sessions
Number theory is ideal for testing HR’s new abilities because many
well-known theorems appear to require Lakatos’s methods. For in-
stance, the fundamental theorem of arithmetic states that all integers
except 1 are uniquely expressible as a product of primes. Similarly,
Fermat’s Last Theorem states that the equation: }~%12f~#4~ has
no integer solutions } 
  and  for any  except 1 and 2.
In the first session with HR, we wished to demonstrate the multi-
agent capabilities. Two agents were run in number theory, the first
with the numbers 1 to 20 and the second with 20 to 40. They
were allowed to request and communicate counterexamples to each
other whenever they made an implication conjecture, and to use
counterexample-barring to fix any conjecture with 1 or 2 counterex-
amples. As an example of their interaction, the second agent invented
the concept of odd numbers, and, later, prime numbers. It then made
the conjecture that prime numbers are odd, and could find no coun-
terexamples between 20 and 40. This conjecture was passed to the
first agent as a set of theory formation steps to carry out in order to
invent the concepts of primes and odds, followed by the conjecture
that the prime implies odd. The first agent realised that the concepts
it required were already in its theory, and found only the number 2 as
a counterexample to the conjecture. On receiving this, the first agent
added three theory formation steps to the agenda, to invent the con-
cepts of: (a) numbers which equal two (b) numbers which don’t equal
two and (c) primes which don’t equal two. On inventing this concept,
it made the conjecture that primes except two are odd, which fixed
the conjecture, making it true. In the same session, they made many
conjectures which aren’t possible without Lakatos’s techniques, such
as: all refactorable numbers except 1 and 9 are even (refactorable
numbers are such that the number of divisors is itself a divisor). This
conjecture is false: the next odd refactorable number is 225.
In the second session, we wished to demonstrate that Lakatos-
style reasoning can be used by HR to find important conjectures.
We started a single version of HR with the numbers 1 to 10 and the
initial concepts of divisors and addition. We specified that HR should
attempt to fix implication conjectures by excepting counterexamples
if there was only one. The size and split rules were used to turn the
concept of divisors into the concept of prime numbers, as described
above, and the split rule re-invented the concept of even numbers:
integers divisible by 2. The compose rule combines the definitions of
two concepts and this was used twice with the concepts of addition
and prime numbers. In this way, HR invented the concept of integers
which can be written as a sum of two prime numbers (which is true
of the numbers 4 to 10). When it invented this concept, HR made the
conjecture that even numbers have this property, but found the num-
ber 2 to be a counterexample. Thus HR invented the concept of even
integers except 2, which fixed the conjecture. That is, HR made the
conjecture that all even numbers except 2 are expressible as the sum
of two primes. This is Goldbach’s famous conjecture which, although
discovered in 1742, is still unproved. Without Lakatos’ techniques
HR would not have been able to generate it. To our knowledge, this
is the first time Lakatos’s techniques have been implemented and
used to re-discover an important mathematical conjecture.
4.3 Other Approaches
The agency described above is one approach to modelling Lakatos’s
methods. There are other approaches, both practical and theoretical.
We do not argue that our approach is better than those described in
this section, rather that the other approaches in AI help to support our
argument that the methods may be implemented.
Hayes-Roth[9] describes 5 heuristics for repairing flawed beliefs,
which are based on Lakatos’ methods and have been partially
implemented. He considers the card game Hearts (like Whist), in
which the pack is divided amongst players. One player plays a card
and the others must all put down a card in the same suit as the first if
they have one and otherwise play any card. The person who played
the highest card in the specified suit wins that trick and starts the
next. One point is awarded for each heart won in a trick, and 13 for
the queen of spades (QS). The aim of the game is to get either as few
points as possible (”go low”) or all the points (”shoot the moon”). A
strategy which beginners sometimes employ is to win a trick to take
the lead and then play a spade, in order to flush out the QS and avoid
the 13 points. Hayes-Roth represents this as shown (p.230):
Plan: Flush the QS
Effects: (1) I will force the player who has the QS to play that
card.
(2) I will avoid taking 13 points
Conditions: (1) I do not hold the QS
(2) The QS has not yet been played
Actions: First I win a trick to take the lead and whenever I lead I
play a spade.
The plan (analogous to a faulty conjecture) may backfire if the
beginner starts with the king of spades (KS) and then wins the trick
and hence the unwanted points (this situation is a counterexample to
the plan). The heuristics then provide various ways of revising the
plan:
1) Retraction (like surrender) - retract the part of the plan which
fails, in this case effect (2).
2) Exclusion (like monster-barring) - bar the theory from applying
to the current situation, by excluding the situation. Add the condition
I do not play KS.
3) Avoidance (like piecemeal withdrawal) - rule out situations which
can be predicted to fail the plan, by adding conditions to exclude
them. For example by assessing why the plan failed add the condition
I do not win the trick in which the queen of spades is played. A system
can further improve its plan by negating the new condition - I win
the trick in which the queen of spades is played, using this and its
knowledge of the game to infer that it must play the highest card in
the specified suit, and then negating the inference to get I must not
play the highest card in the specified suit. This is then incorporated
into the action which becomes First I win a trick to take the lead and
whenever I lead, I play a spade which is not the highest spade.
4) Assurance (like strategic withdrawal) - change the plan so that it
only applies to situations which it reliably predicts. In this case the
faulty prediction is effect (2), and so the system looks for conditions
which guarantee it. It does this by negating it, inferring consequents
and then negating one of these and incorporating it into the action..
For example negating effect (2) gives I do take 13 points, the game
rules state that the winner of the trick takes the points in the trick so
we can infer that I win the trick, then use this and the rule that the
person who plays the highest card in the suit led wins the trick to
infer that i play the highest card in the suit led. Given that player X
plays the QS we can now infer that I play a spade higher than the QS
and negate it to get I play a spade lower than the QS.
5) Inclusion (also like strategic withdrawal) - this differs from as-
surance in that the situations for which the plan is known to hold are
listed rather than a new concept being devised. Therefore instead of
adding I play a spade lower than the QS to the action, we add I play
a spade in i 	p

ﬂ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Hayes-Roth argues that these heuristics can be implemented using
existing techniques (although adding that this may take considerable
effort). The primary capabilities, he claims, are symbolic deduction
and heuristic search. He suggests ways in which one heuristic may be
preferred over another, in order to avoid a combinatorial explosion.
These include preferring general to specific theories,seeking canoni-
cal representations and experimentally evaluating alternative fixes to
determine the most fruitful.
Rissland[24] has carried out much work on the role of examples in
understanding a domain, in particular within mathematics. She has
implemented a system partly based on Lakatos’ ideas on examples
and counterexamples, ExGen, which can generate examples which
meet specified properties.
Finally Bundy6 has suggested other ways, such as using neural net-
works or version spaces[10], trained on positive and negative exam-
ples, to model monster-barring and exception-barring. These would
contain a grey area in which an object would not be categorised
(thus giving the informality needed). Bundy also suggests that proof
analysis[4], in which a failed proof is analysed with a counterexam-
ple to see at which point it fails, is of use for lemma-incorporation. It
could also be used to generate new counterexamples (the method of
proofs and refutations).
5 LAKATOS’ METHODS APPLY TO OTHER
DOMAINS
If Lakatos’s methods are to be of general use in machine creativ-
ity, we need to show that they apply to domains other than three-
dimensional geometry. Theoretical applicability of the methods to
other domains would mean that programs which model the methods
may also work in these domains.
Multi-domain applicability is desirable as programs then avoid
the accusation of fine-tuning (where a program uses procedures to
generate specific desired output, but the procedures do not produce
anything else of value). The degree of fine-tuning in a program mod-
elling creativity was formally defined in [8] and argued to be relevant
to the judgement of creativity. Writing the program for one domain
and then applying it to another gives greater validity to any valuable
output. We have already shown (  4) how the methods apply to num-
ber theory; in this section we describe how they may be used to re-
trieve concepts, conjectures and counterexamples in other domains,
in particular within philosophy. We do not claim that this was how

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such results came about, nor that they occurred in that order - but if
the methods can be used to retrieve a significant number of important
results in a field then we can say that they may be usefully applied
to that field. We have not yet implemented any of these ideas, but
describe where we intend to do so and briefly detail how.
5.1 Game plans
In  4 we describe how Hayes-Roth[9] applied the methods to game
plans. The plan if I do not hold the QS and it has not yet been played
and I win a trick and then play a spade, then the outcome will be
to force the player with the QS to play it and I will avoid taking 13
points is shown to be flawed by the situation occurring in which I
play the KS but end up with the 13 points. Various ways of revising
the plan were shown, and their relation to Lakatos’ methods.
5.2 Two-Dimensional Geometry
A theoretical case study in [21] describes how we could implement
the methods in two-dimensional geometry using HR. An agent uses
induction on examples of squares and triangles to conjecture that for
all shapes, the number of vertices ( * ) equals the number of edges
( + ). A second agent sends  below, which has 5 vertices and 6
edges. The first uses monster-adjustment, re-representing it as having
4 vertices (excluding the middle one) and 4 edges. The second then
generates z , which has 5 vertices and 6 edges. In an effort to save
the conjecture they generate the concept polygon - a shape in which
all vertices touch exactly two edges. This includes all examples and
excludes all counterexamples (including the different interpretations
of  ). Exception-barring is then used to modify the conjecture to
‘for all polygons, * = + ’.
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Figure 4. Example shapes we hope to generate in 2D geometry
5.3 Moral Philosophy
Lakatos’ methods can be used to generate concepts, conjectures and
examples from undergraduate philosophy textbooks. Utilitarianism,
the principle that an action is right insofar as it tends to maximise
happiness [20], is a standard position in normative ethics. Our uni-
verse of interest is now actions and the two initial concepts those
actions which maximise happiness and those which are good.
Suppose that in an agent’s data base all actions which maximise
happiness are categorised as good. Therefore by induction, it arrives
at the conjecture - that all actions which maximise happiness are
good [20], and sends this to the other agents. They look for a coun-
terexample, i.e. an action which maximises happiness but is not good.
The act of breaking promises, for example if
u
owes  ten pounds
but gives it to  because  needs it more ( }  )[20], is found and the
method of surrender used to claim that .- [27]. Monster-barring
might be used to redefine the concept actions which maximise happi-
ness as actions which, if practised generally, would maximise happi-
ness [20]. Since (it can be argued) the traditional practice of keeping
promises is one which maximises happiness, the new concept ex-
cludes }  . -C is now All actions which, if practised generally, would
maximise happiness, are good. This is rule-based utilitarianism [20].
Again agents search for examples of actions which satisfy the first
concept but not the second. McCloskey[18] considers a situation in
which the sheriff of a small town can prevent mass riots, in which
hundreds of people will be killed, only by framing and executing an
innocent man. If the action to be practised generally is minimising
human suffering, then the sheriff should do so, thus satisfying the
first concept but possibly failing on the second as it can be seen as
wrong. Monster-adjusting might be used to claim that if seen if a
different way the action is good. If it is accepted that there are only
those two options specified, then either option is morally reprehen-
sible and the sheriff’s action of framing and executing the innocent
man is the lesser of two evils [26]. Alternatively the concept of unjust
actions (discussed in [20]) might be formed by doing exception bar-
ring (piecemeal exclusion) on the counterexamples. The conjecture
All actions (except unjust actions) which maximise happiness, are
good might then be formed (not a stance taken in the philosophical
literature as it weakens the conjecture too much).
We might use Mill’s ‘proof’ of the utilitarian principle to form
more concepts and conjectures, and to find more counterexamples:
1) happiness is our sole ultimate end, 2) promotion of human ends is
the test by which we judge human conduct, therefore 3) all actions
which maximise happiness are good.
The search for a counterexample which would violate the first lemma
(proofs and refutations) might lead to the example of George who
is a pacifist but is offered a job researching chemical warfare. He
desperately needs a job, and could slow down research if he took
it, but would have to go against his principles ( }  )[27]. Williams
claims that it would be wrong for George to take the job since this
would lack personal integrity. By this he means that the link between
commitments and actions would be broken. Personal integrity is, he
claims, an end in itself. Whether this refutes the conjecture as well
as the first claim (i.e. is a global or local counterexample) is contro-
versial (doesn’t personal integrity in general maximise happiness?).
Since the claim is explicitly stated in the lemma, lemma incorpo-
ration might be used on }  to form the concept actions in which
happiness is the only end concerned, and conjecture all actions in
which happiness is the only end concerned, which maximise happi-
ness, are good. Finally an agent might find the example of capital
punishment for murderers which may maximise happiness (the rela-
tives of the victims might feel happier) but not be considered good.
Hidden lemma incorporation could be used to find the hidden as-
sumption that all reasons behind happiness are morally equivalent,
i.e. someone’s revengeful glee is morally equivalent to the satisfac-
tion Mother Teresa gets from helping the needy (the distinction be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate desires is made in [16]). This could
be made explicit in the argument, i.e. the first premise becomes: 1)
happiness is our sole ultimate end, and all reasons for happiness are
morally equivalent.
We intend to work in this domain using a datafile Moral Reason-
ing which is currently employed by machine learning programs. It
contains information about 200 people, attributes including whether
or not they caused harm, whether or not they had a plan, if they were
careful and whether they were found guilty or not guilty. ML pro-
grams are supposed to learn a rule or rules which will enable them to
predict whether a person is guilty or not. When we ran HR (without
Lakatos’ techniques) on this data it constructed a large set of im-
plication conjectures such as `ﬂ `j c eX`  ¡` c e¢
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5.4 Philosophy of Mind
Horn [12] has developed a graphical approach to argumentation anal-
ysis. Using the technique of mapping issues and their connection to
each other onto large posters, he is mapping the ‘great debates’. His
first debate to be published presents the arguments which surround
the question “Can Computers Think?”, and while not comprehen-
sive, the map is the result of a major project which consists of seven
large wall maps in which more than 800 arguments are represented.
It is interesting to see how many of the arguments can be retrieved
using Lakatos’ methods (all arguments in this section are on [12]
and are not our own). For instance one of the main conjectures is
that ‘computer programs cannot be creative’ - found by induction
on the many non-creative (and lack of creative) computer programs.
Counterexamples - computer programs which are creative - include
Johnson-Laird’s jazz generator, Cohen’s AARON and Klein’s book
generator. Some of these are then monster-barred, for instance it is
argued that the book generator is not really creative. The concept of
creativity is then explored and tightened up, in the same way as as
barring the hollow cube lead to a tighter definition of the concept
polyhedron.
5.5 Political argument
It seems clear that Lakatos’ methods apply to subjects such as phi-
losophy, law and politics, in which persuasive reasoning is all impor-
tant and definitions, claims and arguments are modified according to
the proponents’ goals. A recent example of political argument is the
controversy over the American government’s treatment of the Tal-
iban prisoners. The Geneva Convention states that “all prisoners of
war should be treated humanely”. This is the initial claim (or conjec-
ture). The counterexample then arose of prisoners of war who were
not being treated humanely. Since the government did not wish to
violate the Geneva Convention, when challenged with the counterex-
ample they claimed that the Taliban prisoners were not prisoners of
war. (This is similar to claiming that the hollow-cube is not a poly-
hedron, i.e. monster-barring.) Therefore the government’s treatment
was not a valid counterexample, and the Geneva Convention was not
violated. To aid the argument a new concept - battlefield detainees -
was invented to describe the prisoners7.
5.6 Meta-level reasoning
The domain of meta-level reasoning is clearly important if the meth-
ods are to be used to transform a concept space. Some of the methods
may be used to determine which method is appropriate in a given
situation. For example a mathematical agent may use induction to
form the conjecture ‘exception barring always produces good re-
sults’. Another agent may find an example of something produced by
this method but not consider it a good result (the disagreement may
arise if the first agent does not know of the counterexample, or it may
know it but evaluate it differently). For instance if the second agent
worked in philosophy it might produce the counterexample above, in
which the conjecture ‘actions which maximise happiness, are good’
is modified using exception barring to ‘All actions (except unjust ac-
tions) which maximise happiness, are good’ which may be evaluated
poorly since it too weak to be useful. This might result in examining
ª
The definition of humane treatment was also disputed - in particular whether
it could ever include interrogation, as the American government felt it im-
portant to interrogate the prisoners while not wanting to be open to the
charge of inhumane treatment.
the concept ‘good’, or using exception-barring to modify the con-
jecture to ‘exception barring always produces good results, except in
philosophy’.
With respect to HR the methods are heuristics which suggest the-
ory formation steps such as which concept or conjecture should be
developed. This is not meta-level reasoning but could be used to
enable it to transcend usual heuristic boundaries. One of the suc-
cesses of HR is its ability to reason at the meta-level without major
changes being made (shown in [7]), and so the combination of HR
and Lakatos’s methods looks promising for meta-level reasoning.
6 CONCLUSION
Lakatos’s Proofs and Refutations provides a rich account of the his-
tory and development of a mathematical field, and contains much of
interest to AI researchers. Our argument is that it is especially rel-
evant to machine creativity. In describing methods which explore,
transform, re-represent and evaluate a domain it seems tailor made
to creativity research. We have argued in this paper that Lakatos’s
work can be used to address key issues in machine creativity, helping
to:
(i) identify a putative concept space - mathematics;
(ii) explore this concept space - by building a theory containing con-
jectures, concepts and examples/counterexamples;
(iii) transform the concept space - using the methods themselves to
suggest theory formation;
(iv) suggest when and how to re-represent knowledge, and what to
do with the new representation - by the method of monster-adjusting
which is used to preserve a conjecture thought valuable, and results
in exploration of subconcepts inherent in the conjecture; and
(v) develop an account of dynamic evaluation criteria - by the method
of lemma incorporation, which suggests ways of modifying a proof
or argument - see as evaluation criteria for a conjecture.
We have also described various approaches to implementing these
methods - including our own approach using HR, and our prelimi-
nary results which we consider very promising. Finally we have ar-
gued that Lakatos’ methods are not limited to mathematics but apply
to many domains.
We now intend to implement further methods, in number theory
and then in 2-dimensional geometry and moral reasoning. We will
then attempt to show that this is important to machine creativity, by
evaluating our resulting system with respect to its creativity (and if
appropriate, compare it to previous versions of HR). We will refer to
recent creativity measures such as those in [22].
Despite the obvious fact that almost all areas of knowledge have
grown through collaboration of some sort (in which we include com-
petition, disagreement, etc), there has been little attempt within ma-
chine creativity to model social interaction ([25] is one exception).
Lakatos’s work on the history and philosophy of mathematics is in-
valuable to researchers in this field.
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